

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	Bulgaria	REPORT	
SUBJECT	Gara Kostinbrod Radio Trans- mitting Telegraphic Center and Radio Jamming in Bulgaria	DATE DISTR.	25 June 1963 50X1-HUM
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- 2 -

Power of Transmitters at Gara Kostinbrod.

1. One transmitter was regularly used for jamming Western broadcasts beamed to Bulgaria. It was a Soviet-manufactured, water-cooled transmitter, which was purchased and installed in 1953 or 1954. Its Russian designation was KB-5, (KV-5). It operated on a dipole antenna and was used for jamming broadcasts from BBC, VOA, RFE, and the Vatican, usually in the sectors of the 25, 31, 41, and 49 meter bands. The jamming activities of the transmitter were controlled exclusively by the Control Center, which was in a three or four-story building at 101 Boulevard Georgi Dimitrov in Sofia. The identifying Morse signal of the transmitter was D-7. The transmitter was rarely used for telegraphic communications and only on occasions when no other transmitter for such purposes was available. 50X1-HUM
2. A [] transmitter of Italian manufacture was used only for jamming Western broadcasts beamed to Bulgaria. The transmitter was used simultaneously with two other jammers at the control center in Sofia. Originally the transmitter was of 1-kilowatt power, and later was increased slightly to an unspecified power capacity. The transmitter was water-cooled and operated on a dipole antenna. The functions of the transmitter were regulated only by the Control Center in Sofia through a telephone. The transmitter operated daily on 791 KHz from 2030 to 2100 hours and from 2130 to 2200 hours. [] the simultaneous operation of the transmitter with two other transmitters of the Control Center in Sofia was used only for jamming the limited area of Sofia. The transmitter was old, unstable and was difficult to operate. 50X1-HUM
3. Four other transmitters were in use exclusively for retransmitting Soviet broadcasts in English, German, French, Arabic and Armenian languages. During free time from the above mentioned activities, each transmitter was used by means of directional antennas for jamming Western broadcasts beamed to the USSR. The four transmitters were of Soviet manufacture, 50-kilowatts, and SNEG type. When in use for retransmission of Soviet broadcasts, all four transmitters were beamed to the West at the combined power of 200 kilowatts. The activities of these four transmitters were controlled exclusively by the Control Center in Sofia. 50X1-HUM

Type Modulation Used.

4. The radio transmitting telegraphic center in Gara Kostinbrod, operated on AM and FM, or on AM/FM combined, depending on the purpose and targets involved. The station acted as a teletype transmitter between Sofia and Moscow. [] communication with Moscow [] was on frequency modulation. [] the station had strict daily designated hours for telegraph broadcasts between Sofia and Peking, and Sofia and Buenos Aires. The broadcasts were on amplitude modulation. [] the transmitters had to be ready for traffic between Sofia and Buenos Aires each day at about 0500 and 2330 hours, and between Sofia and Peking at approximately 1230 hours, Bulgarian time. 50X1-HUM

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 3 -

Frequency Ban Covered.

5. [redacted] three of the 50-kilowatt Soviet transmitters were jamming daily at 0700 hours in the area of 11,000 KHz, while the fourth 50-kilowatt transmitter was jamming in the area of 12,000 KHz. The 5-kilowatt transmitter described in para-1 above, was jamming the Western broadcasts beamed to Bulgaria in the area of 9,635 KHz. The medium wave transmitter described in para-2 above, was jamming in the area of 791 KHz. 50X1-HUM

Speed of Frequency Change.

6. The station's officially designated time limit for changing the frequencies was five minutes by one operator. It was possible the frequency could be changed within the period of three to four minutes.

Decision to Change the Frequency.

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7. The overall responsible authority for changing the frequency when jamming Western broadcasts beamed to Bulgaria was the Control Center in Sofia.
8. Any changes in frequency of jammings of Western broadcasts beamed to the USSR were initiated in Moscow and were relayed to the radio station Gara Kostinbrod via the Control Center in Sofia.

Area Covered by Jamming.

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9. No information was available. [redacted]

jammers of the Gara Kostinbrod station engaged in jamming of Western broadcasts beamed against Bulgaria were successful in covering Sofia proper and the vicinity of about 40 to 50 kilometers in diameter. [redacted] within the so-called "dead area" of about 1-kilometer radius from the transmitter's antenna, it was possible to listen to the broadcasts being jammed quite clearly. [redacted] the director of the Gara Kostinbrod radio station [redacted] used to listen regularly in his office to the VOA programs, in spite of the jamming in process. 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM

Effectiveness and Coverage of Area Jammed.

10. The effectiveness of the jamming and the size of the area were never known by the transmitter operator, but only by the responsible technicians at the Control Center in Sofia.

Monitoring Facilities.

11. The radio station in Gara Kostinbrod had no monitoring facilities or equipment associated with the jammers. All broadcasts and jamming activities of the radio station were being regularly monitored by special crews at the control center in Sofia.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 4 -

Sofia Radio Stations and Television Department.

12. The Sofia Radio Stations and Television Department (Otdel Na Sofyiski Radio Statsyi I Televisia) decided and scheduled in advance the length of Western programs and the wave lengths to be jammed. The schedules were distributed to radio technicians on each shift assigned to this work. The technicians were uninformed as to the type of program or nationality of the broadcast to be jammed. They were required to adhere to the schedule and each operator countersigned his assignment on the schedule. Any deviation was subject to severe punishment. Local broadcasting stations in Bulgaria were governed by the same rules. Occasionally orders were telephoned from the Radio and Television Department directing the jamming of a new station or a specific program not on the schedule.

Bulgarian Radio Programs Broadcast to West.

13. Bulgarian broadcasts to the West were slanted to reflect the standard propaganda line of the Communist regime. They never reflected actual conditions or opinions and usually contained lies, half-truths, distortions and were poorly presented. Programs for broadcast to the West were compiled and directed by the Ministry of Culture. Only trusted persons of the Communist regime and Party members who were qualified linguists acted as controllers and monitored all broadcasts to the West. They checked over programs to be broadcast and were prepared to detect any deviations from the original script, i.e. change of phraseology, words, improper punctuation, intonation, emphasis or enunciation.

1. [] Comment. [] the Control Center was known and always referred to by the Bulgarian abbreviation KHTs. []

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